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I. Introduction
Health care is a rapidly developing issue of central and
compelling importance within the European Union.' Global
epidemics and emergencies such as the SARS crisis of 2003 and
the Avian Flu threat demonstrate both the reality of a new disease
spreading throughout a "highly mobile, closely interconnected and
interdependent world" as well as the limitations of national
governments in responding to such challenges independently.
2
Since its first confirmed identification in November 2002, over
four thousand people contracted SARS throughout the world.
This experience forcefully demonstrates the truth that national
health protection relies on global health detection and prevention.4
At the same time, EU Member States face perhaps an even more
serious fiscal health care crisis domestically. An aging population
and advances in treatment and technology are causing national
health care expenditures to continue growing throughout Europe,
outpacing the ability of national governments to finance their
I See generally TAMARA K. HERVEY & JEAN V. MCHALE, HEALTH LAW AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION 110 (2004).
2 See World Health Organization Meeting of Interested Parties, Issues Paper of 3
November 2003, MIP/2003/IP/I, http://www.who.int/mip/2003/official/en/MIP 03 IPI-
en.pdf (2003) [hereinafter WHO Issues Paper]; see also David Woodward & Richard
Smith, Global Public Goods and Health: Concepts and Issues, in GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS FOR HEALTH: HEALTH ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 5, 5
(Richard Smith, Robert Beaglehole, David Woodward, & Nick Drager eds., 2003).
3 The World Health Organization [WHO], Cumulative Number of Reported
Probable Cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Apr. 25, 2003,
http://www.who.int/csr/sarscountry/2003-04-23/en/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
4 See WHO Issues Paper, supra note 2. The World Health Organization attributes
successful containment of the 2003 SARS outbreak to international detection and
response systems, including the Global Public Health Intelligence Network and the
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. See id. at 1. These international
organizations enabled identification and containment of SARS within four months of the
first reported outbreak. See id. While the SARS crisis provided an opportunity to
observe the coordination of international organizations in an emergency situation, it also
threw into vivid relief the failures in the system. See id. at 1, 2. Following the crisis the
World Health Organization and other international players called for greater national
investments in global health mechanisms. See id. at 2. The crisis also precipitated
"sweeping" revisions to International Health Regulations. See id.
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provision.' In 2003 the thirty Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Countries, who represent
the wealthiest nations in the world, spent an average of 8.8%
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on health care.6 That number
continues to grow and national investment in quality continues to
disappoint policymakers and populace with its diminishing
returns.' The most recent survey of public opinion conducted by
the European Commission indicates that health care is one of the
greatest challenges facing individual nations, trailing behind only
unemployment, the economy, and crime. 8 Rising health care costs
is an issue of such importance and magnitude that nations must
utilize every resource available to address the challenge. 9 This
effort includes utilizing resources at a "federal" and intra-national
level within the EU. l° As a result, health care, originally accepted
5 See Press Release, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
[OECD], Rising Health Costs Put Pressure on Public Finances, Finds OECD (May 26,
2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/37/0,2340,en2825 495642_
36986213 Il 1,00.html (last visited Jan 2, 2007) (noting that health care spending
has increased at a greater rate than GDP in every OECD country with the exception of
Finland); Accord, Health Care Crisis Continues for Most European Countries, 19
BIOMED. Bus. INT'L NEWSL. 233, Dec. 1996, available at
http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_m3570?is-n12v19/ai_19002744. See also Claus
Wendt, Simone Grimmeisen, and Heinz Rothgang, Convergence or Divergence of
OECD Health Care Systems, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SOCIAL SECURITY:
HOW TO COPE WITH GLOBALIZATION 15, 21 (Bea Cantillon & Ive Marx eds., 2005). See
generally Michael Blanke & J. Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg, Preface, in
RATIONING OF MEDICAL SERVICES IN EUROPE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY xix, xix (Michael
Blanke & J. Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg eds., 2004).
6 OECD Health Division, Health at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2005, at 70
(2005), available at http://www.sorceoecd.org/socialissues/9264012621; see also Grace-
Marie Turner & Robert Moffill, European-Style Health Care? Time for a Reality Check,
GALEN INSTITUTE, Dec. 17, 2006, http://www.galen.org/healthabroad.asp?doclD=950
(noting that government spending in health care accounts for over half the GDP of
France and Sweden and over 45% in Germany and Italy).
7 See Health Care Crisis Continues for Most European Countries, supra note 5;
see also Wendt, et. a]., supra note 5, at 21.
8 European Commission, Eurobarometer 65: Public Opinion in the European
Union, First Results, July 2006, at 8, 59-60, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
public-opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65-first en.pdf.
9 See David Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementary, Rivalry and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 546 (2007)
[hereinafter New Governance and Legal Regulation].
10 Throughout this paper, the term "federal" is used as an analogy to the US
System, and refers to collective EU action pursuant to organizing treaties.
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as a purely domestic policy prerogative, is increasingly associated
with the EU's active sphere of competence. 1  "Federal"
participation in the governance of health care thus reflects the
concerns of European citizens and the realities of a universal
global health crisis.
12
The European Community has taken advantage of Union
authority and intra-national resources to address unemployment,
the economy and crime, 3 but has historically been hesitant to
mobilize an intra-national health policy strategy.' 4  Health is
different, both in its specific organization and its importance to
society generally. 5 As such it should be governed and regulated
II See generally HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 1, at 110.
12 See Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 3, COM (2001) 428
final (July 25, 2001) [hereinafter White Paper], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001 428en0l.pdf (noting that
European citizens "expect the Union to take the lead in seizing the opportunities of
globalization .. and in responding to challenges ... They expect the Union to act as
visibly as national governments"); see also Communication from the Commission to the
Council, The European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on the Health Strategy of the European Community, at 1,
COM(2000) 285 final (May 16, 2000) [hereinafter Communication from the Commission
to the Council], available at http:/leur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServlsitelenl
com/2000/com2000_0285en01.pdf; David Byrne, European Commissioner for Health
and Consumer Protection, Address Before the European Health Forum on "Common
Challenges for Health and Care": Future Priorities in EU Health Policies (Sept. 26,
2002) [hereinafter Byrne, Future Priorities], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/426&format=HTML&aged=l&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en; Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Social Security Regulation in the
EU: The De-Territorialization of Welfare?, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE: IN
SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY 89, 98 (2005) (asserting that welfare policy "remains closely
related to the idea of the national state" which exercises the traditional prerogative of
determining the nature and extent of social benefits provided within its territory).
13 See, e.g., HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 1, at 110. Examples include Europole,
the European Union's criminal investigatory force founded in the Maastricht Treaty in
1992, the European Central Bank (currently adopted by half of all Member States), the
Common Foreign and Security Policy established by the Maastricht treaty and the
Customs Union and single currency.
14 See Grafinne de Bdrca, Towards European Welfare?, in EU LAW AND THE
WELFARE STATE: IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY, supra note 12, at 1.
15 Memorandum from the Commission, Questions and Answers on Health Services
in the EU, Brussels European Council (Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum on
Health Services] available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/06/319&format=HTML&aged=1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en
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according to a different methodology. 6  Traditionally that
methodology has been to leave well enough alone. 7 Recently,
however, politicians and populace alike recognize not only the
benefits and practical necessity of health policy convergence, but
identify the development of an EU Health Strategy as integral to
the legitimacy of the European Union.1 8 Thus, policymakers have
slowly restructured the popular understanding of not only federal
spheres of action, but also the nature and function of governance
and regulation. 9 Regulation and governance is no longer limited
to a command-and-control mentality; instead, policymakers are
making a conscientious effort to integrate broader participation in
developing performance standards and indicators through soft law
mechanisms.2 ° Governance is now understood to refer to "steering
the flow of events, rather than.. .enforced compliance with rules."'"
Central to the debated health strategy is whether there is an
16 Id.
'7 See, e.g., de Bdrca, supra note 14. This approach is based on the principle that
the coordination of social welfare services is a national responsibility and the fear that
any interference or regulation of national distribution of services would lead to
unanticipated and critical social effects. The latter reasoning is based on a recognition
that the importance and impact of health care on society is both pervasive and
(presumably) unpredictable.
18 See Byrne, Future Priorities, supra note 12 (arguing that "Health is a
preoccupation of Europeans ... [and] that there can be no Europe without a Europe of
Health"); see also Memorandum from Markos Kyprianou, Commissioner of Health and
Consumer Protection, on the Orientation Debate on Health Services to the Commission,
SEC(2006) 1095/2 (Sept. 4, 2006) available at http://www.cse-
d.eu/csesite/accueil.nsf/url/rattachement/$file/Note%2OKyprianou.pdf, [hereinafter
Kyprianoul.
19 See Judith Healy & John Braithwaite, Designing Safer Health Care Through
Responsive Regulation, 184 MED. J. AUSTL. S56, S59 (2006) ("[T]he crucial difference
from the old 'command and control' view is that governments increasingly 'steer not
row' and are seeking flexible, participatory and devolved forms of regulation."); see also
Maurizio Ferrera, Towards an 'Open' Social Citizenship?: The Boundaries of Welfare in
the European Union, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 12, at II
(positing that European integration has slowly but fundamentally altered popular
conception of the function of governance and the relationships between governing
institutions); see also White Paper, supra note 12, at 3.
20 White Paper, supra note 12, at 3 (asserting that the EU must develop a "policy-
making process to get more people and organizations involved in shaping and delivering
EU policy ... [while] promoting greater openness, accountability and responsibility for
all those involved").
21 Healy & Braithwaite, supra note 19, at 56.
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enforceable minimum standard of care in Europe. In this context
minimum standard of care refers to the baseline quality of practice
and quantity of services received.23 Member States typically
define national standards of health care access through the services
included in national insurance systems and enforce these standards
through traditional mechanisms of regulation and litigation.24
However, these instruments are not available at a federal level
within the EU.25 If European citizens are entitled to "high quality
protection" of health care, as asserted in the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights,26 how is this standard to be identified and
enforced? The answer, provided through ten years of
collaborative and consensus-building relationships, is through
information management and new governance techniques.
Today Europe has reached a political and philosophical
27
consensus on the existence of a pan-European right to care.
Despite this philosophical consensus, very real obstacles still
prevent the identification, implementation, and enforcement of a
hard law standard in health care throughout Europe.28 These
obstacles include philosophical tensions between competing
principles of "federal" authority versus state sovereignty, as well
22 See Panos Kanavos, Martin McKee, & Tessa Richards, Cross Border Health
Care in Europe: European Court Rulings Have Made Governments Worried, 318 BRIT.
MED. J., 1157, 1158 (1999) (outlining the importance of the ECJ's decisions in Kohll and
Decker by asserting that they raise the question of whether there should be a standard of
"package of care" available throughout the EU).
23 See BOARD ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY, 96 (2002),
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/4/165/AssuringFINAL.pdf.
24 See HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 1, at 110; see generally Vassilis
Hatzopoulos, Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU, in EU LAW AND THE
WELFARE STATE: IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY, supra note 12, at I 1l.
25 White Paper, supra note 12, at 32 (noting that "people have similar expectations
for the Union as they have for domestic politics and political institutions. But the Union
cannot develop and deliver policy in the same way as a national government; it must
build partnerships and rely on a wide variety of actors. Expectation must be met in
different ways.").
26 The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, The Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364/01), at art. 35 [hereinafter
The Charter of Fundamental Rights], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter
/pdf/text en.pdf
27 Kyprianou, supra note 18.
28 Id.
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as more practical concerns, such as the fear of undermining the
financial integrity of individual national health programs. 29  As
noted in the ECJ's decision in Geraets-Smits Peerbooms v.
Stichting Groeup Zorg, if the EU were to articulate a specific
"federal" right of care, "all the planning which goes into a
contractual system in an effort to guarantee rationalized, stable,
balanced and accessible supply of [health] services would be
jeopardised at a stroke." 30 Addressing the challenge of modem
public health policy while simultaneously respecting national
sovereignty and national social service infrastructure therefore
requires compromise and coordinated collaboration.3' Such
cooperation also requires rethinking and restructuring of
governance paradigms and expectations.32
During the last ten years, as the European Union has engaged
in an aggressive (albeit fractured) effort to centralize health care
within EU policy and its sphere of competence, the Commission
has utilized various techniques, including traditional regulatory
models.33 However, efforts to integrate and collaborate have been
29 National Health plans rely on prospective budgeting to finance services. In
budgeting for the upcoming fiscal year (and in an effort to control costs) states must be
able to (1) roughly predict populations (the number of people covered) and (2) restrict
utilization by restricting services covered. See Colleen Flood, Mark Stabile, & Carolyn
Hughes, The Borders of Solidarity: How Countries Determine the Public/Private Mix in
Spending and the Impact on Health Care, 12 HEALTH MATRIx 297, 334 (2002) (asserting
that UK health systems specifically have implicitly relied on physicians and health
authorities to anticipate and ration publicly-funded health care services.); see also
HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 1, at 139.
30 Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and
H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5473
[hereinafter Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61999J0157:EN:HTML..
31 Ferrera, supra note 19, at 16.
32 See generally Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a "Post Regulatory" World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 103 (2001) (positing that regulation is increasingly separated from state police
action and that the nature of modem regulation is increasingly characterized by a more
cooperative and dynamic model); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342, 343 (2004) (suggesting that deregulation in environmental law indicates a
larger collective shift in governance models and expectations).
33 As illustrated in the original "Bolkestein" Service Directive. See Freedom
Fried, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2006, at 12.
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most successful through soft law measures, which may be
characterized as convergence through persuasion.3 4  Throughout
the development of the EU Health Strategy, the EU has
conscientiously exhibited a consistent preference for non-binding
soft-law regulations.35 This preference is reflective of both the
political and constitutional limitations of the Union, as well as the
dynamic nature of modem medicine.36 This policy preference was
demonstrated most visibly in the recent removal of Health
Services from the controversial Service Directive by parliament in
February of 2006."7 By removing health care services from the
Directive, policymakers responded to the popular cry that "health
is different" from other services and that consequently the EU role
in governing health services requires a non-traditional approach.
3 8
Examination of the continuing evolution of EU health policy
serves as a case study of the larger convergence of economic and
social policies within the EU and the development of an
international forum on health care reform.3 9 Convergence presents
34 See Tamara K. Hervey, The European Union and Governance of Health Care, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, 179, 184 (Grafnne de Bdrca &
Joanne Scotts eds., 2006); but see Alexander Somek, Exploring the Context of European
Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS, 959, 997
(suggesting that in the absence of traditional enforcement procedures there is inadequate
incentive for the dissemination of "best practices" to have lasting effects in social
policy).
35 See Hervey, supra note 34, at 180; see also Antonio S. Serrano, Improvements in
Cross-Border Access to Health Care within the European Union, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J.
553, 563 (2002).
36 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155,
161 (2004) (positing that globalization, a global health crisis, and the "biotechnology
revolution" necessitate a "fourth age" in health care regulation; one that is characterized
by de-regulation and increased attention to and participation of stakeholders); see also
Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 137, 147 (2006) [hereinafter New Governance and Soft Law]; see also
Healy & Braithwaite, supra note 19, at S56..
37 See Dan Bilefsky, EU Legislators Pass Law to Increase Cooperation in Services,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 16, 2006, at F I.
38 "It was felt that specificities of health services were not sufficiently taken into
account, in particular their technical complexities, sensitivity for public opinion and
major support from public funds." Memorandum on Health Services, supra note 15.
39 Convergence may be characterized as the "search for an optimum set of social
arrangement" across industrialized societies. Through social and economic exchanges
societies adapt to one another and adopt similar governance structures and governing
infrastructures. Colin J. Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, 21
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both practical and political obstacles, such as the competition
between the socio-political independence of the Member States
and the Union. This tension is best illustrated in the health policy
debate.
II. Policy as a Process - Not a Product: Defining New
Governance and Soft Law
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, against the
backdrop of global competition, [and] changing patterns in market
organization.. .contemporary legal thought and
practice... [pointed] .. .to the emergence of a new paradigm - [new]
governance... [which] supports.. .a more participatory and
collaborative model, in which government, industry, and society
share responsibility for achieving policy goals. The adoption of
governance-based policies redefines state-society interactions and
encourages multiple stakeholders to share traditional roles of
governance.. .Lawmaking shifts from a top-down, command-and-
control framework to a reflexive approach, which is process
oriented and tailored to local circumstances. 4°
New governance41 is a complex, evolving and increasingly
wide-spread governance mechanism which synthesizes a number
of modem legal policy theories, including "democratic
experimentalism," "new regionalism," and "communicative
governance. 42  It may be briefly (and broadly) described as a
B. J. POL. S. 215, 215-216 (1991).
40 Lobel, supra note 32, at 344-45.
41 New governance refers to the "range of activities, functions and exercise of
control by both public and private actors in the promotion of social, political, and
economic ends." Id.
42 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 147; see, Grafnne de Bdrca &
Joanne Scott, New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 2 (de Burca & Scott, eds., 2006), [hereinafter
Law and Constitutionalism]; see also Lobel supra note 32, at 344; see also Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267 (1998); see also Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 876 (2003); see also Jan Kooiman, Findings,
Speculations end Recommendations, in MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT -
SOCIETY INTERACTIONS 249 (Jan Kooiman ed., 1993) (democratic experimentalism refers
to a "new" form of governance in which relaxed regulatory standards and
decentralization allows local flexibility in responding to local manifestations of national
issues. The collaborative and pedagogic "national" infrastructure under democratic
experimentalism then provides for information and gain-sharing on a larger level.
20071
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construct designed to address traditional policy needs but
operating outside the traditional, formal legal infrastructure.43
Instead, it is characterized by the greater participation and
collaboration of non-traditional players,4" the use of consensus
building mechanisms,45  reliance on peer review and
collaboration,' and the integration of public-private partnerships
and research experiments into the formal policy-making process.47
As such, new governance constitutes a departure from traditional
"command-and-control" models, providing a new framework for
policy-development: one in which the State's responsibility is
navigational, leaving responsibility for policy outcomes
distributed across society.48
A. "The Center Will Not Hold": The Need for
Communicative Governance in the Administrative State
49
Traditional governance, or hard law, is characterized by
inflexible centralized decision-making, uniform regulations, and
court-enforced compliance. ° These rigid governance mechanisms
prove increasingly inadequate in the face of modem policy
challenges, such as: a larger, global playing field; expanded parties
Cooperative governance focuses on the institutionalized relationship between private
stakeholders, citizens, and public governing offices).
43 Law and Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 2. "Hard law" refers to the
traditional regulatory enforcement model which relied on litigation to ensure compliance
with policy objectives. See, e.g., New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 149.
44 These players include stakeholders instead of mere representatives in the
decision-making process. See, e.g., Law and Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 3.
45 See Hervey, supra note 34, at 180.
46 Id.
47 Id. (as such it indicates a "shift away from the [traditional institutional] control
and monopoly over political and social issues and implicates a greater, concerted
incorporation of 'stakeholders' within a non-traditional 'framework."); see also Wendy
Netter Epstein, Bottoms Up: A Toast to the Success of Health Care Collaboratives, 56
ADMIN L. REv 739, 741 (2004); see also Lobel, supra note 32, at 344.
48 Epstein, supra note 47, at 741.
49 "Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer /
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold / Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world."
William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH
LITERATURE 2106, 2106 (M.H. Abrams & Stephen Greenblatt eds., 2000).
50 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 149; see also New Governance
and Legal Regulation, supra note 9, at 542.
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of competing stakeholders; political fragmentation between
administrative and governing agencies; and increasingly complex
policy issues. 5" These challenges are compounded in health
policy, a field that relies on experimentation, interaction and
adaptation, something the older, formal system can no longer
provide.52
The older system, without some changes cannot deal with
diversity, the development of new technologies, the increasing
flow of new knowledge, and the eroding faith in
professionalism... [It] cannot deal with the increased information
available through the combination of evidence-based medicine and
electronic records. This increas[e]...[in available] information has
created an explosion of new knowledge which depends on
feedback and iteration... [which] requires interaction between
domains.53
As the above observation illustrates, the traditional, regulatory
model of health law fails in its inability to both adapt to a dynamic
global information market and to adopt an infrastructure for the
interaction between both policymakers and practitioners.54 This
deficit in traditional regulation is illustrated most clearly in the
area of medical malpractice in the United States. New
governance accommodates the modern need for flexibility and
51 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 149; see also Doff & Sabel,
supra note 42, at 267.
52 The failure of the old regulatory system is manifest from the most cursory glance
and the current medical malpractice system. See New Governance and Soft Law, supra
note 36, at 142.
53 Id. at 150 -51.
54 See generally Frances Lee Ansley, Rethinking Law in Globalization Labor
Markets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 369, 369 (outlining how the global market
challenges traditional regulatory models); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing
Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 926 (1996) (examining
the development of the internet and its impact on the State's traditional nexus of control
and regulation).
55 David Blumenthal, Making Medical Errors into "Medical Treasures", 272
JAMA 1867, 1867 (1994). Litigation as a primary instrument of quality enforcement is
increasingly discredited from a public, and quality standpoint. The threat of malpractice
discourages practitioners from acknowledging past medical errors and using them as a
larger teaching opportunity among colleagues. The traditional governance model not
only fails to encourage needed interaction but restricts or "chills" such communications.
See ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 14 (Harvard
University Press 2001).
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interoperability through its reliance on soft law instruments,56 such
as consensus building, peer performance review, and
benchmarking. 5' These methods encourage experimentation,
accommodate diversity, provide for feedback, and incorporate
greater stakeholder participation. 58  Thus new governance may be
characterized as a mechanism for communicating and mediating
interactions between policymakers.
Greater participation and collaboration are necessary, or rather,
inevitable in a modem global market. 59 In the modem information
age the State no longer has a monopoly on economic or political
power.6 ° Instead, power "flows through networks that are more
fluid and complex than older structures of governance.,' 6' As the
policy playing field expands to incorporate new players, new
mechanisms are needed to accommodate and respond to extended
56 "Soft law" indicates that there is no binding force to enforce provisions, which
distinguishes it from traditional, regulatory "hard law." In a recent research paper
commissioned by the European Commission, scholars Anne Peters and Isabella Pagotto
capture the ambiguous and broad nature of non-traditional soft law by defining it as
quasi-legal constructs that are "on the one hand not legally binding in an ordinary sense,
but are on the other hand not completely devoid of legal effects either." Anne Peters &
Isabella Pagotto, Soft Law as a New Mode of Governance: A Legal Perspective;
NEWGOV: NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE PROJECT, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.eu-
newgov.org/database/DELIV/D04D 11_SoftLaw as a ..NMG-LegalPerspective.pdf.
57 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 148; see also New Governance
and Legal Regulations, supra note 9, at 540 ; see Lobel, supra note 32, at 345
(explaining that new governance models are characterized by "new" strategies such as
"negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-based rules, decentralized
dynamic problem solving, disclosure regimes, and coordinated information collection").
58 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 148; see also New Governance
and Legal Regulations, supra note 9, at 540; Sam Sheps, Governance for patient safety:
Lessons from non-health risk-critical high-reliability industries, Summary of Research
Results, University of British Columbia, Dec. 2005, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/sr-
sr/alt.formats/hpb-dgps/pdf/finance/hprp-prpms/final/2005-sheps e.pdf.
59 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New
Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687. 1693-94 (2002). Globalization refers to the
"complex social, economic, and political processes that in effect denationalize and
deterritorialize states." Through globalization the stream of commerce and
communication occurs largely outside the management of the state. In order to respond
to the effects of international commerce (most notably in environmental protections)
state must cooperate, creating international authority and collaborations. This process of
intra-national collaboration is referred to as "deterritorialization." Id.
60 Law and Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 2.
61 Healy & Braithwaite, supra note 19, at S56.
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participation and interests.62 New governance and soft law
provide this mechanism. By acceding to and accommodating
greater stakeholder participation, new governance distributes
61power in policy decisions. 6 Similarly, the collaborative paradigm
of the new governance model enables policymakers to balance
between commitments and competing interests in a global
economy and among various stakeholders. 6 New governance, a
fundamentally informal system of governance and cooperation,
therefore presents a formal and reliable methodology for resolving
competing principles and interests presented in the modem global
market.65
As illustrated above, new governance provides an
infrastructure that mediates relationships and interactions between
stakeholders and policymakers. This interactive model is of
critical importance in adapting existing governance structures and
expectations to the demands of a dynamic global economy.
Because soft law has no binding power to enforce compliance,
it depends on voluntary collaboration and competition to
encourage compliance with policy goals.66 Soft law derives its
persuasive power through information management, namely data
collection and comparison of peer institutions.6 7  This
accomplishes two targeted goals in health policy. First, by
providing a forum for information exchange, governments can
62 See, e.g., Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy, New Governance,
http://wage.wisc.edu/research/collaboratives/governance/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2007)
(noting that new governance offers a balance: "between commitments to an open world
economy and national regulatory and social polices; new forms of transnational and
supra-national coordination and regulation . . . [and] cooperation between public and
private actors").
63 Id.; see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1, 1 (1997) (suggesting that formalized collaborations between
public and private actors create new opportunities in governance and require greater
agency flexibility).
64 Healy & Braithwaite, supra note 19, at S56, (noting that new governance
incorporates alternative, soft law mechanisms to address a balance between competing
stakeholders).
65 Id.
66 ld; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 42, at 268.
67 See generally Alexander Somek,, supra note 34, at 995 (identifying discourse as
the "chief instrument of governance" within a soft law framework); see also Hervey,
supra note 34, at 191.
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accelerate the creation and dissemination of evidence-based "best
practices., 68  "Best practices" refers to a method of scientific
management and quality assurance that assumes that there is a
technique or process which will yield optimal results.69  The
modem practice of "evidence-based medicine"70  relies on the
incorporation of best practices into routine care and medical
decisions.71 Second, by publishing peer reviews and comparative
quality assessments of peer institutions, soft law encourages or
"shames" individual institutions into complying with evidence-
based practices and improving the standard quality of practice.7"
New governance may therefore be characterized as a "carrot and
stick" mechanism of quality convergence and improvement. It
thus indicates a departure from the centralized command-and-
control regulatory approach characterized by traditional
lawmaking,73 focusing instead on data collection, information
exchange, and the development and dissemination of "best
68 See Hervey, supra note 34, at 191 (recognizing that state cooperation in
collecting and distributing data on best practices "by reference to common challenges to
national health care systems from technological development").
69 See generally ROBERT KANIGEL, The ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW
TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY, New York, Penguin Books (1997).
70 David L. Sackatt, et. al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't,
312 BRIT. MED. J. 71, 72 (1996). Evidence-based medicine is "the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of
individual patients." Id.; see also Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-
Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA
2420, 2420 (Nov. 14, 1992) (introduces the practice of evidence-based medicine and its
emphasis on research and information sharing as the new paradigm for modem medical
practice).
71 See generally Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare
Governance in Transition, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 245 (2003-2004) (suggesting
that systematization of health care practices is necessary in order to identify disparities in
health care treatment).
72 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 149-50 ("It can encourage
mutual cooperation and exchanges of knowledge and experience through collection,
systematization, and diffusion of knowledge. Soft law can be seen as fostering
consensus making and incentives to voluntary learning, as much as by shaming."); see
also Marshall Ruffin, New Governance for a New Era: Issues and challenges for
integrating systems, 9 PHYSICIAN EXEC. 42, 44 (Sept. 21, 1995) (contending that the role
of a governing structure is to "force independent operating units to adhere to standards.
• [which] will allow the entire system to operate more effectively and efficiently" and to
encourage systemic quality improvement through the dissemination of information).
73 Law and Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 2.
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practices, 74 creating a governance mechanism that is "less rigid,
less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less
hierarchical in nature.""5 This flexible and evolving governing
structure better accommodates the dynamic nature of health care.76
The EU acknowledged the emergence and the importance of
new governance and soft law as a governance strategy in a
Commission sponsored White Paper published in 2001.77 In the
White Paper the Commission outlined five pillars of good
governance: (1) openness; (2) participation; (3) accountability; (4)
effectiveness; and (5) coherence - all principles central to the new
governance paradigm.78 New governance, broadly identified in
the Communication as the future direction of "European"
governance, has the potential to not only address these essential
principles of representative governance, but also to adapt to the
demands of a changing world and an evolving, dynamic industry.
As noted in the White Paper, the structure, challenges and
expectations confronting the Union are changing. 79 The Union's
legitimacy depends on responding to these new challenges by
incorporating broader participation and involvement. 80 The White
Paper concludes that this involves restructuring the larger
framework of governance: "The Union is changing... its
legitimacy today depends on involvement and participation. This
means that the linear model of dispensing policies from above
must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks
and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all
levels.'
This shift in governance structure also indicates a shift in the
74 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 149 (positing that "there is an
emphasis on monitoring results through the collection and public dissemination of data
that can lead to revisions and create financial incentives.").
75 Id.
76 Id. at 140.
77 See generally White Paper, supra note 12 (outlining the challenges facing the
EU in the upcoming decade, the White Paper explains the need for a more
communicative and inclusionary governance model).
78 Id. at 10.
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way we think about law and the function of the policy process. 82
Under such an information-based governing structure, the "center"
(in this case the EU) fulfills a pedagogical role. The center is a
facilitator, providing a forum for exchange, identifying disparities,
and allowing disparate stakeholders to interact more easily. 83 As
international law scholars and new governance experts Grainne de
Bdrca and Joanne Scott assert, the federal state's core function is
no longer to be the sole purveyor of policy; instead, its purpose is
to facilitate the development of governing infrastructure and
oversee the interaction between stakeholders within the
governance framework.84
III. Defining EU Jurisdiction
The story of the European Union has been one of steadily
expanding powers, of an incremental extension of policy capacity
across many aspects of economic, political and social life. And
yet there are areas ...a nucleus of (national) sovereignty.. .in which
the states retain primary competence and the EU's influence is
indirect or relatively minor... [Thus] even though the EC for many
years has had legal power to regulate... the remit of the EU's
social policy remains closely tied to labour-market participation,
leaving the broader fields of welfare provision and regulation
essentially to the states.
85
European Union preference for new governance in social
policy is a natural selection - a process tailored to the international
nature of the emerging economic (and later socio-political)
community.8 6 As scholars Anne Peters and Isabella Pagotto note,
the European Union initially lacked the authority to enforce hard
law measures. Collaboration through soft-law mechanisms
enabled the EU to take action (if indirectly) where its legal
82 New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 139 (explaining that the
emergence of new governance alongside traditional approaches creates a new dynamic
interaction affecting our conception of health policy and regulatory authority); see also,
Healy & Braithwaite, supra note 19, at 10.
83 Law and Constitutionalism, supra note 42, at 3.
84 Id. (asserting that under a new governance model the "center's" primary role is
in "facilitating the emergence of governance infrastructure, and with ensuring co-
ordination or exchange as between constituent parts").
85 de Bdirca, supra note 14, at 1.
86 See Peters & Pagotto, supra note 56, at 5.
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authority and legitimacy was not yet developed or accepted.87 Use
of less controversial soft law measures to supplement Member
States' public health initiatives initially allowed the EU to act in a
sphere where its legal jurisdiction was questionable and provided
the opportunity for high level deliberation on the future role of EU
governance in health policy.8
8
A. The Expanding Orbit of Federal Authority in Social Policy
To appreciate the importance and necessity of soft law in the
context of European social policy, it is necessary to understand the
political infrastructure and mandate of the European Union. The
European Union is a government of limited or derived powers.89
The European Union began as an extended economic trade
agreement; as a result, those powers did not originally extend to
social policy.90 While Member States, in forming the original
European Union, were motivated by social objectives, particularly
establishing "an ever closer union among European peoples," 9'
and improving their respective national standard of living, 92
community action was limited to enforcing the elimination of
trade barriers. 93  The Treaty of Rome identifies economic
integration as the best assurance of such national social benefits,
and makes no provision for direct Community action.94
Jurisdiction was therefore limited to harmonization of trade
87 Id.
88 See id. at 25-26.
89 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 308, March 25,
1957, 340 O.J.C. [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The EU can only act where it is
"necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the
objectives of the Community and ...[the] Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers."
90 Id. at art. 2.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at art. 3(a).
94 Id. at art. 2. These economic priorities (and the social principles motivating
them) are spelled out carefully in the original treaty: "It shall be the aim of the
Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the
economic policies of Members States to promote ...a harmonious development of
economic activities ... an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of
living and closer relations between its Member States." Id.
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policies and tariffs and there was no formal or informal
mechanism for developing Union social policy, which remained
entirely the purview of national governments. 95
Today, the European Union's authority over social policy has
expanded dramatically. 96 This expansion of power is a product of
a closer, more integrated Union, and is legally justified through the
"necessary and proper" clause of the original Treaty.97 This
clause, and Europe's use of it to expand policy powers, suggests
that there are "few [legal] limits upon which the region can
legislate... once a political consensus has been reached. 98 The
problem arises out of developing that consensus in an environment
of competing Member States, all of whom are naturally careful to
preserve their national autonomy. The history of European formal
involvement in intra-national social policy is therefore a series of
compromises, marked by both recognition of the benefits of
centralized oversight and the imposition of restrictions to protect
against undue encroachment.
95 Treaty of Rome, supra note 89, at art. 2. In the neo-liberal economic world
following the Second World War, European governments accepted the elimination of
international trade barriers as the best assurance of national social benefits. Id. at art.
3(a). The treaty acknowledges that the development of the Common Market will benefit
convergence of social systems, but aside from assuming an aspiration for close
collaboration between the Commission and Member State Governments in the field of
social policy, the administration of social policy (with the exception of a few soft law
reporting measures) remained the responsibility and prerogative of Member States. Id. at
art. 2.
96 This expansion has been encouraged by an active (and some argue activist)
Judicial Branch. This expansion in the sphere of "federal" or supranational authority is
illustrated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the earlier Treaty of Rome: "The
Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic
and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities ... to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of
economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality
between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection
and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living
and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member
States." Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities, art. 2, Nov. 10, 1997, 340 O.J.C.
97 Treaty of Rome, supra note 89, at art. 235 (allows the EU to act where it is
"necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the
objectives of the Community").
98 RALPH FOLSOM, EUROPEAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 33 (2005).
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The organization and delivery of health care services remains
the express responsibility of individual Member States.99 Member
States have the exclusive authority to organize and administer
health services. Despite this express reservation of power, the EU
as a "federal" body increasingly involves itself in the governance
of health care," thus gradually but fundamentally altering the
institutional relationships and governance expectations.' °0 This
explosion in EU participation in health care services was sparked
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 1997 decision in Kohll v.
Union des Caisses de Maladie challenging the legality of barriers
to patient and practitioner mobility within the Union. 102 Kohll has
since been dubbed the hard law catalyst for soft law reform.' °3 In
Kohll, a Luxembourg native was refused prior authorization and
reimbursement for dental services sought in Germany. The Court
held that national rules restricting reimbursement of the costs of
services available through a State's health care system but
provided in other Member States is illegal because these rules
infringed on freedom of services principles by discouraging
publicly insured patients from contracting with medical service
providers in other Member States.'°4
B. Free Mobility Principles: Between a Rock and a Hard
Place
Article 49 EC prohibits restrictions on freedom of mobility of
services within the EU.' °5 "Services" were originally understood
to encompass commercial transactions for "remuneration," thereby
99 EU Constitution Treaty, Article 111-278 (7) CT; see generally Kyprianou, supra
note 18.
100 Hervey, supra note 34, at 179. Scholar Tamara Hervey goes so far as to classify
EU attention and action as an "explosion" in EU government involvement over recent
years. Id. at 180.
101 Ferrara, supra note 19, at 11.
102 Hervey, supra note 34, at 183-84. Article 49 EC prohibits restrictions on service
mobility within the EU. In Kohll the scope of "service" was applied to publicly financed
national health care services for the first time. Id.
103 Id. at 185.
104 Case C-158/96 Kohil v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1931, at
para 1.
105 Hervey, supra note 34, at 182.
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excluding publicly-financed health care systems. 10 6 However, in
Kohil, the ECJ departed from conventional wisdom and held that
the "special" and social welfare nature of health care services does
not exempt it from the "ambit of the fundamental principles of
freedom of movement." 10
7
Although in the absence of harmonization at Community level
Member States were free to determine conditions concerning the
right to be insured with a social security scheme or for entitlement
to benefits, they were in so doing, nonetheless, required to comply
with Community law, including Articles 59 and 60 EC.10'8
By redefining the scope of services covered by the treaty to
encompass publicly financed health services, the Court established
the foundation and authority (indeed the necessity) for EU action
in monitoring health quality and developing a federal policy on
health care; however, it did not clarify the scope of that
authority. 109 One of the most fundamental questions presented by
Kohl is whether it creates an enforceable European standard of
care, and if so, how to determine and fairly evaluate its application
given disparities in access and quality practices across the Union.
110
Conversely, the ECJ's decision in Kohl1 did not further
articulate on the restrictions imposed on Member State actions.
While the Court aggressively asserts that the Member States have
broad discretion in the operation and administration of their social
security systems, it also stresses that national health services are
still subject to the principles of free movement of services.11 In
106 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 89; see also Hervey, supra note 344, at 182.
107 Kohll, supra note 104, at para. 1.
108 Id.
109 Mike Sedgley, Smits/Peerboomns: A clarification of confusion? 7 EUROHEALTH
1,1 (2001). "In attempting some sort of balance between a right to receive and an
obligation to provide, the judgments seem to grant to citizens the right to cross border
care, as long as the operational integrity of national systems is not undermined by large
numbers of people acting on their right." Id.
110 Memorandum on Health Services, supra note 15.
ill See Case C-372/04, Yvonne Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of
State for Health, 2006 E.C.R. 1-04325 at sec. 3, para. 37, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0372:EN:HTML (holding
that a Member State may not restrict access to health care services except where such
restrictions are necessary in order to maintain the financial integrity of the facilities
administration, where such restrictions impose undue delay in the treatment of a patient
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Kohil, the Court reasoned that restrictive policies, such as prior
authorization for services contracted abroad could be "justified,"
namely if there is a "genuine and actual risk" of undermining the
financial integrity of national health systems."l 2 This decision
acknowledges the complex and potentially fragile economic
balance in budgeting for health care services and demonstrates a
determination not to interfere unduly, opening a "Pandora's box"
of health care management.1 3 National health plans rely on
prospective budgeting to finance ser.ices. In budgeting for the
upcoming fiscal year, states must be able to roughly predict
populations (the number of people covered) and restrict utilization
by restricting services covered.' 14  Kohl indicated that trade
barriers to patient and practitioner mobility could be justified. A
string of patient mobility cases following Kohl further elaborated
on this theme, as articulated in the later Smits-Peerbom v. Stichtig
Ziekenfonds case. In Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, the Court broadly
summarized justified public interest as ensuring universal access
and quality of care for citizens by maintaining the financial and
administrative infrastructure of national health plans; by providing
non-discriminatory coverage; and by preserving resources to
they are no longer justified); see also Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, supra note 30 (where
the court accepted a restrictive national policy as justified but formally reaffirmed a
European citizen's right to the best medical treatment available throughout the Union).
112 Kohll, supra note 104, at para. 5.
113 See HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note l, at 138-39 (critics of the court's decision
in Kohll frequently reference its potential "impact on the stability and internal balance of
national health . .. systems, and the viability of their social goals"); see also
MAGDALENE ROSENMOLLER, ET AL., Patient Mobility: The Context and Issues, in
PATIENT MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE, (2005)
(Rosenmoler. McKee, Baeten, eds.), available at http://www.iese.edu/
en/files/6_22160.pdf.
114 See Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile, & Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, The Borders of
Solidarity: How Countries Determine the Public/Private Mix in Spending and the Impact
on Health Care, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 334 (2002) (explaining that UK health systems
have implicitly relied on physicians and health authorities to anticipate and ration
publicly-funded health services); see also HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 1, at 139
(noting that "States calculate their health care needs by reference to their populations ...
[t]oo much movement of patients might result in overburdening ... [thus jeopardizing]
the national health ... systems of all Member States"); see generally PABLO GOT-rRET &
GEORGE SHIEBER, HEALTH FINANCING REVISITED: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, 2006 (The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank eds., 2006).
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address national needs." 5 In implementing these standards, the
courts took a permissive approach. For example, in Vanbraekel v.
Alliance Nationale des Mutualits Chritiennes, to assert a Belgian
patient's right to have services in France, the Court calculated a
Belgian schema." 6  In Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms the Court
accepted a restrictive national policy as justified but formally
reaffirmed a European citizen's right to the best medical treatment
available throughout the Union." 7 Most recently in Watts v.
Bedford Primary Trust, the Court asserted the primacy of
European Community law over national regulations, but held that
a one-year waiting period for certain medical procedures was not
an unreasonable obstacle to heath service."' These European
Court of Justice decisions outline broad principles and apply them
to specific fact scenarios but are inadequate to independently
provide the legal clarity needed for national policy." 9
Kohll and the string of decisions that followed not only carved
out a federal role in the sphere of health care but also presented a
politically charged confrontation between nationalist and federalist
principles. The creeping expansion of EU social policy mandated
by the ECJ and affirmed in following treaties necessitates a
changing dynamic between national governments and the
Community. Under this changing relationship, social power and
benefit allocation have become "less comprehensive and
'ultimate.""' 2 0
115 Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, supra note 30.
116 Case C-275/04, Abdon Vanbraekel and others v. Alliance Nationale des
Mutuelitds Chr6tiennes, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5363, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2001/c_275/c_27520010929en00020003.pdf.
117 Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, supra note 30.
118 Watts, sec. 3, para 37.
119 See Elias Mossialos & Martin McKee, Health Care and the European Union:
Profound but Uncertain Consequences for National Health Systems 324 BRIT. MED. J.
991, 991 (2002) ("A failure to address health care explicitly at a European level means
that the evolving legal situation is based largely on policies designed to address broad
principles ... but leaving uncertainty as to how they should be interpreted in similar but
slightly different circumstances.").
120 Ferrara, supra note 19, at I ("[T]he integration process has been gradually
weakening two essential traits of social sovereignty in its traditional meaning: 1) the
capacity of a state to 'lock in' and exert coercive rule on actors and resources which are
crucial to the stability of redistributive institutions within the national territory and 2) the
capacity of a state to bar external authority structures from interfering into their own
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IV. Health is Special: State Sovereignty and National
Identification
The success or failure of any government in the final analysis
must be measured by the well-being of its citizens. Nothing can
be more important to a state than its public health; the state's
paramount concerns should be the health of its people. 121
Health occupies a special place in the national consciousness
(and as a reflection of the national conscience) of the modern
state.122  A government's legitimacy depends on its ability to
provide for and protect the health of its citizenry.2 3  Health
security and promotion are therefore both necessary
responsibilities of any formal State structure and useful tools in
defining and strengthening broader governance.
A. State Sovereignty and National Identification
Health care is of particular symbolic importance in Europe. 124
Following the devastation of World War H, health services
developed as a very nationalist statement of social values,2 5 and
even today allotted expenditures continue to assert and to identify
social space and jurisdiction."). Id. at 1-2.
121 Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to the New York Legislature, (cited in
Lawrence Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law?, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 509,
510-11 (2004)).
122 Gostin, supra note 121.
123 Randy Cheek, Focus on Medical Diplomacy: Public Health as a Global Security
Issue, 81 F.S.J. 22, 23 (Dec. 2004) ("Public health is the basic tenet upon which all other
forms of security rest ... Thus a government that cannot secure the health of its people
has failed in its most fundamental responsibility, [and will lack] legitimacy.").
124 See Ferrera, supra note 19, at 11.
125 The Beveridge Report, an expansive social insurance proposal presented to
British Parliament in 1942, is the paradigm example of a shift in governing paradigms
and national identification. The Beveridge Report, passed in 1946, established the
British National Health Service and created a right of care for all British citizens.
Similar social insurance initiatives developed in France. See Daniel T. Rogers,
Borrowing Policy, 21 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 431, 437 (2000) (explaining the
evolution of the "European Social Contract" following the Second World War and the
development of national identification through shared social values); see also Ruth Ben-
Israel, Social Security in the Year 2000: Potentialities and Problems, 16 CoMP. LAB. L.J.
139, 143 (1995) (outlining the development and progression of liberal social security
systems throughout the world).
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with these values. 2 6 The European countries are predominantly
welfare states. 127 As such, the social benefits of citizenship hold an
important place in defining governments and the legitimacy of
governance: "[T]he right to decide about the forms and substance
of social citizenship has always been considered in its turn a
crucial aspect of national sovereignty." 128 Social policy, therefore,
is "closely related to the idea of the nation state," which exercises
the traditional prerogative of determining the nature and extent of
social benefits provided within its territory.
129
France, for example, has long prided itself on its
comprehensive health system. In 2000 the World Health
Organization named France the best public health system among
the 191 developed nations surveyed. 3 ° This social and political
prioritization of health care is reflected in the nation's budget
allocations.' The organization of a national health plan also
functions as a very specific statement of national values.
The nature of health care services provided in a national plan
also indicates national priorities and values. 3 2 For example, the
Swedish care system incorporates a strong emphasis on family
medicine and home care.' As such, it may be distinguished from
126 See Eleanor Kinney & Brian Clark, Provisions for Health and Health Care in the
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 37 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 285, 287 (2004).
127 Ferrera, supra note 19, at 11.
128 Id. (asserting that "social components of citizenship are no less important than its
civil and political components").
129 Martinsen, supra note 12, at 98.
130 Patrick Lenain, Santj to the French Public Health System, OECD OBSERVER,
October 2000, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/356; see
D. Benamouzig & Robert Launois, Rationing Health Care in Europe - France, in
RATIONING OF MEDICAL SERVICES IN EUROPE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 27, 55 (J. Matthias
Graf von der Schulenburg & Michael Blanke eds., 2004).
131 Lenain, supra note 130 ("Health spending in France as a percentage of GDP far
outstrips the average for OECD countries"//l/); 'see Kinney & Clark, supra note 126, at
294 (health expenditures provide a "crude indicator" of national commitment to health as
a social value).
132 See, e.g., Maurizio Ferrera, Social Citizenship in the European Union: Toward a
Spatial Reconfiguration?, in Reconstructing Territoriality: Europe and the United States
Compared, 90 (Christopher Ansell & Giuseppe di Palma, eds., 2004).
133 Grazya Adamiak & Ingvar Karlberg, Situation in Sweden, in INTEGRATED CARE
IN EUROPE: DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED CARE IN Six EU COUNTRIES,
41,42 (A. von Raak, et al., eds., 2003).
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Austrian health services, which are notable for the absence of a
model of integrated care. 1
34
Similarly, organization of health care services is indigenous to
and reflective of national governance structures. 135  This
organization is illustrated in the Finnish health system, which is
constructed around local, municipal governance.'36 This focus on
local governance means that the Finnish system lacks the "second
tier" of state oversight built into neighboring Sweden's governing
structure. 137  This structure impacts both the delivery and the
design of health care service.
B. Health as a European Value and a European Right
Health care is fundamental to the development of a supra-
national "European" identity and has been used rigorously in the
"Europeanization" campaign.1 38  EU activity in health care is
increasingly identified as a linchpin in developing such an
inclusive social and political consciousness.
In December 2000 the European Parliament passed The
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 3 9 The Charter was designed to
create "an ever closer union... based on common values"'140 and
incorporated a universal right of access to health care "under the
conditions established by national laws and practices."1 4' It also
articulated a federal role in ensuring health protection by
134 See Paolo Rondo Brovetto & Eva Krczal, Situation in Austria, in INTEGRATED
CARE IN EUROPE, supra note 133, at 73.
135 See Sirkka Sinkkonen & Pekka Jaatinen, Situation in Finland, in INTEGRATED
CARE IN EUROPE , supra note 133, at 15, 15; see also, Jaane Martikainen & Hannu
Valtonen, Rationing Health Care in Europe - Finland, in RATIONING OF MEDICAL
SERVICES IN EUROPE, supra note 130, at 3.
136 Sinklonnen & Jaatinen, supra note 135.
137 Id.; see Martikainen & Valtonen, supra note 135, at 8.
138 "Europeanization" refers to the development of a continental European identity.
See Martinsen, supra note 12, at 89.
139 The Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 26; see generally Siofra
O'Leary, Solidarity and Citizenship Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 12, at 39, 45-47
(outlining the development, passage, and legal implications of the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights).
14o The Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 26, at Preamble.
141 Id. at art. 35.
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'centralizing' health policy within "all Union policies and
activities. 142
The Charter thus lays the groundwork for former
Commissioner Byrnes' aggressive EU public health campaign and
for the later EU Health Strategy framework. 143 As Commissioner
of Health and Consumer Protection, Commissioner Byrne
recognized the practical exigency and symbolic importance in
developing a cohesive and responsive federal health policy and
advocated for centralizing public health concerns in all EU policy
decisions.'44
Health is a preoccupation of Europeans. We need to get it
right on health, if we are going to get it right on a new Europe that
means something to our citizens ... [O]ur citizens are telling us...
that there can be no Europe without a Europe of Health... And
they expect their Europe to put their health at the centre of its
agenda. 
45
Attention to and action in health care is necessary for EU
legitimacy. 146 Congruently, adoption of a European health policy
serves as an important tool in defining federal, European values
and developing a European consciousness. 147
C. Health Security: A Global Concern
[P]ublic health is the basic tenet upon which all other forms of
security rest ... Since security must now be addressed globally, so
must its basic foundations - including health. It is no longer
enough to concern ourselves with national health, for threats to
security in any region, however remote, can have serious
implications for all regions. Global threats require global
solutions, and the threat to public health is no exception... 48
142 Id.
143 Europa, Health Strategy, http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph-overview/strategy/health
_strategy-en.htm (last visited Sep. 2, 2007).
144 Byrne, Future Priorities, supra note 12.
145 Id. (emphasis in original)
146 See White Paper, supra note 12, at 11.
147 Byrne, Future Priorities, supra note 12 ("We are at a crossroads in Europe today
Perhaps all this would be clearer to our citizens - if we obsessed a little less about
'Europe', and a little more about 'Europeans."').
148 Cheek, supra note 123, at 22-23 (arguing that the United States must coordinate
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In addition to health care as a tool in developing a federal
consciousness and as a necessary mechanism in the global market,
the communicable nature of disease and of health security risks
necessitate supra-national surveillance and' protection. 149  This
lesson was forcibly brought home to the United States following
the September 1 1 th attacks and the anthrax scares, 150  and
repeatedly impressed upon the European Community with the
naturally-occurring SARS and Avian Flu epidemics. 5' The threat
presented by communicable disease is global in nature, so
preventive and responsive management models must be global in
kind.5 2 The 2003 SARS scare and the 2005 Avian Flu crisis
present the most dramatic examples of the need for supra-national
preventive oversight and response systems. It should be noted that
the Community Action Programme for Health was launched in
2003, following the SARS crisis. '53 As Commissioner Byrne
stated in his address at the European Health Forum, "[t]here must
be a role for the Community."'
' 54
D. EU Health Strategy
The ECJ's decision in Kohll, Decker, and subsequent cases
preventive and supervisory health initiatives internationally in order to protect US health
security).
149 Id. at 29 ("The commitment of global resources is the only answer to the
challenge of infectious disease. The threat to human security is not restricted to
individual nations or regions, so the response must be on a similar scale."); see
generally, Patrick Wallis, Book Review, 18 Soc. HIST. MED. 496 (2005) (reviewing
DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE (2004)).
t5o US GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HHS BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS:
STATES REPORTED PROGRESS BUT FELL SHORT OF PROGRAM GOALS FOR 2002 (2004),
available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04360r.pdf (despite attention and resources
the United States in particular remains behind in health security preparedness, reports a
Congressional Committee on Bioterrorism preparedness).
15, See Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb: The Legal System Will Play a Key
Role in Planning the Response to a Possible Onslaught of the Virus, 91 A.B.A. J. 36, 38
(Nov. 2005)
152 Cheek, supra note 123, at 23; see also William Onzivu, Globalism, Regionalism
or Both: Health Policy and Regional Economic Integration in Developing Countries, an
Evolution of a Legal Regime? 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 111, 115 (2006).
153 See generally David Bishop, Lessons From SARS: Why the WHO Must Provide
Greater Economic Incentives for Countries to Comply with International Health
Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1173 (2005).
154 Byrne, Future Priorities, supra note 12.
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constituted a radical reinterpretation of EU's role in social policy
and governance. While the shared sphere of competence is now
generally accepted, developing political and social consensus of
federal authority was. not an immediate or organic process, but
rather the product of a continuous debate and an aggressive
political and social campaign to "sell" Europeanization. The
concept of shared competence is now formalized in the Treaty of
Nice. '51 In the midst of all of this conflict was the growing need
for legal clarity, not only in regards to what the EU as a federal
body could do, but also articulating what Member States could not
do. In other words, what constitutes an unjustifiable barrier to the
free movement of health care services needed defining.
V. The Service Directive
Today, political leaders throughout Europe... [face] a real
paradox. On the one hand, Europeans want them to find solutions
to the major problems confronting our societies. On the other
hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are
simply not interested in them... [This problem] is particularly acute
at the level of the European Union... The Union is often seen as
remote and at the same time too intrusive. 56
Sponsored by Fritz Bolkestein, Director of the Internal Market,
the original Directive on Services in the Internal Market proposed
the creation of a single, integrated service market. 57 Keeping with
ECJ interpretation of publicly financed health cares services as
within the scope of community action, the original proposal
155 Treaty of Nice: Amending the Treaty of European Union, The Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and certain Related Acts, March 10, 2001 O.J.
(C. 80/16), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/
12001CEN.pdf. Signed in 2001, the Treaty of Nice was designed to address the
challenges presented by the enlargement of the EU. In order to adapt to the changing
circumstances of the Union and the socio-economic disparities between the older,
established member states and the new members, the Treaty provided for a great
expansion of centralized power generally. While the Treaty (the most recent reforms to
the founding mandate) buttressed expansions made in earlier agreements regarding
governing authority it also built upon those agreements to establish a "shared
competence" between Member States and the federal State in the realm of policy action.
Id.
156 White Paper, supra note 12, at 3.
157 Freedom Fried, supra note 33.
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included provisions on health care systems.'58 The Service
Directive was widely unpopular and generally acknowledged as
the second 5 9 most controversial proposal sponsored by the EU.' 6°
Following popular protests and years of political debate, an
amended version of the Service Directive passed Parliament in
February 2006, and excluded all references to publicly financed
health services. 161
Incorporation of health care services within the Directive on
Services in the Internal Market (Service Directive) was one effort
by the European Community to provide legal clarity on patient and
practitioner mobility. 62 Like the US, the EU is a service-oriented
economy. Services account for seventy percent of all economic
activity within the EU. 163  The Directive formally applies free
mobility principles to the service market, thereby creating a single
service market in the EU.164  A unified service market is
acknowledged as necessary to reach the Lisbon Agenda pledge of




159 See id. The most controversial EU proposal remains the passage of the EU
Constitution. Concerns about the constitution and the Service Directive mirror each
other in their fear of "social dumping" and defense of more protective social and labor
policies.
160 See, e.g., "Bolkestein Directive" to Stay, But Will Be Watered Down, (March 23,
2005, updated May 21, 2007), http://www.euractiv.comen/innovation/bolkestein-
directive-stay-watered/article- 137160.
161 Juan Delgado, The European Services Directive, U.S.-Europe Analysis Series,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, April 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/
papers/2006/04europe-delgado/delgado20060427.pdf.
162 See Commission Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market,
COM (2004) 2 final/3, (March 5, 2004), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0002en03.pd f; see also
Memorandum on Health Services, supra note 15.
163 "Bolkestein Directive" to Stay, But Will Be Watered Down, supra note 160.
164 See Kyprianou, supra note 18. The Service Directive was seen as an
implementation of the Lisbon Agenda goals, where the EU pledged to make the EU "the
world's most dynamic and competitive economy" by 2010. Q&A: EU's Lisbon Agenda,
BBC News, March 22, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/4373485.stm. Organization of a single market system through a service
directive was identified as essential to fulfilling this objective, since 70% of Europe's
GDP comes from the service industry. Id.
165 Kyprianou, supra note 18.
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Originally dubbed "the Bolkestein Directive,"1 66 the Directive
was a controversial initiative to abolish service industry
regulations infringing on free mobility unless the state showed that
such regulations (1) were non-discriminatory, (2) served the public
interest, and (3) were proportionate to the public good protected. 167
These regulations or restrictions were not, in principle,
"revolutionary" in the context of health care, but were a
reaffirmation of the Court's decision in Kohll that "unjustified"
barriers to service mobility are "unconstitutional." '168 The Service
Directive's function is therefore projected as a primarily formal
ratification of existing policy intended to encourage national
political deliberation. 69 Commissioner Bolkestein addressed this
very point in a response to a letter from British public health
officials expressing concern of the supposed "harmonisation" of
health policy and practice through the Directive, asserting:
It is already the case that Member States may not discriminate
against service providers from other Members States... unless
such restrictions can be justified by reasons of overriding
general interest as recognized by the ECJ, and are proportionate.
The Directive would ensure that Member States examine their
legislation systematically to ensure that remaining
discriminatory provisions are removed. 1
70
Despite such assurances, the proposal elicited a virulent and
hostile public response.1 71  Nearly a hundred thousand people
congregated in Brussels in March of 2005 to protest the proposed
Service Directive. 172
The Service Directive and the "country of origin principle"
created controversy generally; however, inclusion of health care
166 Less sympathetic agents have referred to it as the "Frankenstein Directive." See
e.g., Bernard Harbor, No debate on 'Frankenstein' Directive, 5 The Irish Times (May
27, 2005).
167 Kyprianou, supra note 18.
168 See Letter from Frits Bolkestein, Member, European Commission (Aug. 11,




171 See, e.g., Freedom Fried, supra note 33.
172 See Huge Protest Against Bolkestein Directive, SPECTRAZINE, March 21, 2005,
http://www.spectrezine.org/weblog/index.php?p=61.
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services elicited controversy and criticism specifically. 73
Opponents consistently assert that treating health as any other
commercial activity lends itself to unscrupulous practice of
medicine and a serious risk to health care quality.1
74
The [D]irective is controversial because it applies the same
rules to healthcare and social services as it does to estate agents,
fairground providers.. .and private security firms. The commission
no longer sees the services provided.., as a special public good to
be enjoyed by all citizens, but as an "economic activity," a
commodity to be traded across the EU much like any other. 175
Opponents consistently assert that health is different. As one
vocal British politician stated: "For my part, I believe that health is
not a commercial service to be traded across borders like kitchen
sinks.'
176
Consequently, health services were eventually removed from
the amended version of the Service Directive, which passed
Parliament in February 2006.177Removal of public health services
from the Service Directive was important because it was based on
the opinion that "health is different" from other commercial and
social service activities, and because the formalized structure of
health policy within the service market was an anathema to the
existing structure organized through soft law mechanisms.
7 8
Central to this exclusion of health care services is the concept
that such formal (or laissezfaire) procedures are incongruous with
health practices and that in addition to misrepresenting the role
173 Freedom Fried, supra note 33. The biggest problem with the Bolkestein
Directive is with "the country of origin principle," which allows service providers to
practice in Member States under that labor laws and regulations of their home states.
More developed and liberal states, such as France (particularly France) and the UK
protested that this would lead to unfair employment practices, competition and social
dumping. Id.
'74 See David Rowland, In the Health Trade, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 20, 2005.
175 Id.
176 JEAN LAMBERT, GREEN PARTY MEP FOR LONDON, THE BOLKESTEIN DIRECTIVE:
A HEALTH WARNING, available at http://www.jeanlambertmep.org.uk/downloads/
reports/05 10services%20booklet.pdf.
177 Memorandum on Health Services, supra note 15 ("It was felt that specificities of
health services were not sufficiently taken into account, in particular their technical
complexities, sensitivity for public opinion and major support from public funds").
178 Kyprianou, supra note 18.
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and nature of health care, the role of the federal government in
regulating health care is misrepresented. The Service Directive
was, therefore, a break from the model of managing public health
adopted by the European Community following the Kohil
decisions. Upon its removal, the Commission and Commissioner
Kyprianou reasserted earlier soft law approaches.
VI. Persuasive Convergence: The Pedagogical Role of the EU
Governments exist for, and should use their vast powers for the
betterment of, the people. Aside, therefore, from its essential
governing powers, it is the peculiar province of a government,
especially of a national government, to exercise a supervisory,
investigating and, as it were, pedagogic attitude toward the
material welfare of its people. Under this head are embraced
those administrative functions that are of an investigating
statistical nature, that consist not in the exercise of any new
powers, not in the interference with or control of any of the
social activities of the people, but solely in the study of
conditions and of methods, and the diffusion of the information
thus obtained.
179
From the very beginning the EU has accepted a limited role in
the development of social policy, acknowledging that there is a
restricted and specific area where federal action and authority is
appropriate.18 ° That means adapting to a governing structure that
accommodates the social service nature of health care (as
illustrated in the rejection of the Service Directive) as well as
respecting the proper scope of "federal" authority. Health care is a
sphere of "shared competence;" the Union should only act where
something cannot be accomplished at a national level'81 and
where, consequently, supranational action would give added value
to national action. The EU's role is as a supporter and facilitator.
179 W.W. Willoughby, A National Department of Health, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 292, 297 (1893) (arguing for the establishment of a national health
department that fulfills a specific supervisory and "pedagogical" role).
180 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/amsterdam-en.pdf.
181 Treaty On European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5, available at
http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU-consol.pdf (satisfying the subsidiarity
principle articulated in the treaty).
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While this role is limited, it is also unique and necessary; "federal"
oversight provides opportunities not previously available to
national governments acting separately. 182
These principles directed the EU to carefully target its area of
focus and authority. In 2000, the European Commission issued a
communication outlining a broad framework for the future health
strategy of the EU.'83 Publication of this document was the first
step in a larger process of identifying and responding to the need
for a health care strategy. 84  In addition to outlining a broad
statement of need, it submitted a proposal for a Community Action
Programme, which would become the focal point of all EU Public
Health policy initiatives. Building upon the initial communication
following the ECJ's decision in Kohll, the strategy focuses on
"improving health information; establishing a rapid response
mechanism; and tackling health determinants." 185 These three
areas of action constituted then, and continue now, to be the focus
of EU action in public health.
86
Parliament and the Council eventually accepted the program
proposal outlined in the Communication establishing the
Community Action Programme for Public Health in September
2002. Earlier that year the Commission issued an invitation to
health ministers to participate in a High Level Reflection Process,
or working group, on the very issue of health care services in the
182 Council Decision 1786/2002, Adopting a Programme of Community Action in
the Field of Public Health, 2002 O.J. (L 271) 1, 3 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_271/1_27120021009en01001 l.pdf. ("The
Community and its Member States have at their disposal certain means and mechanisms
in relation to information and monitoring in the field of public health. It is therefore
necessary to ensure a high level of coordination between actions and initiative taken by
the Community and the Member States to implement the programme, to promote
cooperation between Member States and to enhance the effectiveness of existing and
future networks in the field of public health."); Id. ("It is essential that the Commission
ensure the effectiveness ... cohesion ... [and] cooperation between Member States.").
183 Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 12.
184 Paul J. Belcher and Phillip C. Bernan, Health in Other EU Policies or an EU
Health Policy?, 7 EUROHEALTH 1, 1 (Autumn 2001), available at
http://www.euro.who.int/Document/Obs/Eurohealth7_4.pdf.
185 Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 12, at 9.
186 Europa, Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public Health (2003-
2008), http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph-programme/programmeen.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2007) [hereinafter Community Action Website].
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Union. The Working Group and their report issued the following
year are identified as the first and most visible "institutional and
governmental response at EU level to the Kohl litigation"'187 and
demonstrate the first serious effort at managing health policy on a
"federal" level.
88
The High Level Reflection Report outlined nineteen
recommendations under five directing principles.1 89 The fourth of
these overarching themes directly addressed policy harmonization
and legal clarity under the title of "reconciling national health
policy with European obligations."'' 90 The Working Group's
response focused on soft law measures and cooperative forums to
resolve conflict between national health policies and the emerging
federal model, but also included hard law recommendations of
treaty reform and secondary legislation. 91 With the passage of
time this developed into a conscientious policy choice: soft law
measures would be used to develop standards and hard law to
enforce them. 92
The Community Action Programme for Public Health
proposed in 2001 has been refined over the years, but the principle
objectives remain the same: "To lay the foundation for a
comprehensive and coherent [EU] approach [to health policy] by
concentrating on three key priorities: health information, health
threats, and health determinants." 193 The Programme is modeled
on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC,
originally developed to address social inclusion disparities, is well
suited to confront the particular challenges presented in health
care. "In this context, the 'open method of coordination' will be a
flexible tool, respecting the diversity of the national situations and
competences and therefore particularly well adapted to the specific
187 Hervey, supra note 34, at 185.
188 See id.
189 Id.
19o Id. at 185-86.
191 Id. at 186 (In addition to the hard law measures outlined above, the Report
focused on "Commission communications; Member State initiatives and bilateral
cooperation; and a permanent cooperation mechanism at EU level.").
192 See id.
193 Council Decision 1786/2002, supra note 183, at 3; see also Community Action
Website, supra note 186.
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features of health care systems in all the branches of social
protection."' 19
4
Just as there are national public goods, so there are
international ones, and many types of knowledge fall into this
category. No single country will invest enough in the creation of
such goods, because the benefits would accrue to all countries
without the creating country receiving full compensation. But
international institutions, acting on behalf of everyone, can fill this
gap. 9
5
VII.Health Information and Indicators: Managing the
Exchange of Information
Following the OMC model outlined above, the Community
Action Programme focuses on the creation and maintenance of
networks and forums for the exchange and dissemination of
information. 196 It is an information-centered network. '9' This
focus on information-based governance can be organized into
three primary functions: (1) providing a forum for political and
policy deliberation; (2) creating a forum for scientific exchange;
and (3) collecting and disseminating health quality statistics and
determinants. These three pedagogic roles all contribute to
clarifying and raising the general standard of care.
A. Political and Policy Deliberation
As noted in the above discussion, the EU's first formal action
in addressing the questions raised by Kohll was to organize a high
194 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the
'Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions -
Modernising Social Protection for the Development of High-quality, Accessible and
Sustainable Health Care and Long-term Care: Support for the National Strategies Using
the Open Method of Coordination', COM (2004) 304 final (Oct. 28, 2004) at 6.
195 World Development Report: Knowledge for Development, World Bank, 6 (1999)
available at http://worldbank.org/wdr/wdr98/overview.pdf
196 Community Action Website, supra note 186.
197 See id. ("As part of this integrated approach, particular attention is paid to the
creation of links with other Community programmes and actions. Health impact
assessment of proposals under other Community policies and activities, such as research,
internal market, agriculture or environment will be used as a tool to ensure the
consistency of the Community health strategy."). Id.
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level working group to reflect on the problem presented.1 98
Between the HLRP, the Working Group, Commissioner Byrne's
Reflection Process, and the current working group developing the
health-specific Service Directive, the history of health policy in
the EU is a string of policy forums and deliberation. However, the
EU's contribution to the health policy debate is not restricted to
formal political deliberation; instead the EU, through the
Community Action Programme has established a series of forums
for both policymakers and industry leaders to collaborate and
exchange information: the European Health Forum Gastein
(EHFG).
The EU relies on the power of the purse to establish and
encourage participation in scientific forums.'99 The most notable
and successful example of such a platform is the European Health
Forum Gastein (EHFG). Established in 1998, the EHFG
incorporates stakeholders from government, industry and
academia in an annual conference on common challenges in health
care.200 The Forum offers a "well-established platform which is
necessary as a think tank to health policy.., and administration in
Europe."' ' The EHFG is not only a think tank or a forum for
deliberation; it has also served as a launching pad for various EU
health projects and initiatives. The EHFG was fundamental in
advocating for including health care in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights in 2000.202 Commissioner Byrne used the conference as a
platform to introduce his "Europe of Health" coalition in 2002.203
Most recently the conference was recognized as central to the
development and the direction of the future EU Health Services
198 Hervey, supra note 34.
199 Id.
200 European Health Forum Gastein [EHFG] Website, In Brief,
http://www.ehfg.org/typo3/index.php?id= 15&L= 1. (last visited Sep. 20, 2007).
201 Leslie Versweyveld, Ninth European Health Forum Gastein 2006 Covers
Diverse Range of Aspects in European Health Care Policy, VIRTUAL MEDICAL WORLDS
MONTHLY, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.hoise.com/vmw/06/articles/vmw/LV-VM- 11-06-
l.html (quoting EHFG President Ginther Leiner).
. 202 EHFG, Gastein Health Declaration of 1999, (Oct. 6-9, 1999), available at
http://www.ehfg.org/typo3/fileadmin/ehfgfWebsite/Archiv/1999/Dokumente/GasteinHe
althDeclaration.pdf.
203 Byrne, Future Priorities, supra note 12 (This initiative has since been accepted as
the philosophical foundation of the EU's developing Health Strategy).
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Directive. 204  Andrzey Rys, Director of Public Health on the
Commission, reiterated this very point in his address to the Health
Forum: "Gastein is a set point on the agenda for the commission's
work and is the best opportunity to present the work of previous
years and plans for next year to experts." 205
The EHFG's value and contribution to the health care debate is
its ability to bridge the gap between policymakers and the
experts.2 °6 Failure to take advantage of the opportunity for
deliberation and cooperation presented by the conference and
other forums means failure in broader public health initiative and
public relations efforts, as EHFG President Leiner emphasized in
his opening address at 2006 Health Forum: "Experts have to
develop solutions, but politicians also have to adequately
communicate this to the public., 207 Failure to cooperate between
these two sometimes disparate camps means failure in
implementing viable and responsive policy, and "no one should be
surprised that... the EU fails to enjoy the credit it actually
deserves. 2 °8
In addition to establishing a forum for deliberation and a route
of access for policymakers and stakeholders, the EU is committed
to developing regular, interoperable information systems between
Member States. 209 The, proposed "European Centres of
Reference" is one example of such a program. These Centres of
Reference are federally-sponsored "poster" facilities, offering
highly-specialized treatments and providing a focal point for
research and information dissemination. 2'0  Although not yet
implemented, the proposal has received warm popular political
support. They were most recently identified as a primary
204 See EFHG Congress: EU Commission Starts Consultation Process for EU Health




207 Versweyveld, supra note 201.
208 EFHG Congress, supra note 205.
209 Hervey, supra note 34, at 189 (citing "health technology" as the greatest
"contributor to escalating costs of the European Health care systems" and recommending
collaboration between the fragmented national systems trying to compare and evaluate
the relative value of new technologies compared to existing, less expensive tools).
210 Id.
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objective of the 2007 Health Plan.
B. Encouraging Interoperability
To take advantage of EU sponsored forums, Member States
must be able to compare systems and output. National Health
services vary greatly in terms of organization, services included,
and population served. What works best in one forum may not
translate to another. By encouraging systems interoperability, the
EU can accelerate the dissemination of best practices in
administration and treatment. 211  Therefore developing quality
indicators is a focal point of the Community Action Programme.212
Quality review and coordination relies on quality measures and
indicators.2"3 This presents two challenges. First, the variance in
health care systems and populations within Member States make
quantifying health outcomes difficult and contentious. Second,
quality of care is a difficult concept to quantify.214 Health care
outcomes are not determinatively dependent on quality of care. 1 5
Quality care encompasses more than mere science and adherence
to "best practices;" quality care is patient-centered care.216 Patient-
centered, quality care involves honoring subjective patient
211 Chris de Neubourg & Julie Castonguay, Ranking Orders: Performance
Indicators for Social Protection Systems, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SOCIAL
SECURITY: How TO COPE WITH GLOBALIZATION? 93, 93 (Bea Cantillon & Ive Marx eds.,
2005).
212 European Commission Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General,
Strategy on European Community Health Indicators: The "Short List" (July 5-6, 2004),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/phjinformation/documents/ev20047O5_
rd09_en.pdf ("Most of the actions supported by the former programme of Community
action ... were in relation to the development of indicators and the improvement of the
methodology of collection of statistics and preparation of reports").
213 Hervey, supra note 34, at 192 ("'hard' quantitative objectives and indicators...
[are the] basis for evaluation and benchmarking").
214 Harvey Jolt & Martin Leibovici, America's Health in Transition: Reforming
America's Health System, IOM White Paper 7 (1994), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=9147&page=Rl (outlining that while
certain areas of care have scientifically accepted methodologies, other areas are behind).
215 See generally Meredith B. Rosenthal, et. al., Early Experience with Pay-for-
Performance: From Concept to Practice, 294 J. AM. MED. ASs'N. 1788 (2005), available
at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/294/14/1788 (questioning a pay for performance
schema).
216 Jolt & Leibovici, supra note 214.
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decisions - sometimes against objective medical advice.217 The
question then is how to quantify and measure quality practices in a
field characterized by uncertainty and where no outcomes (save
eventual death) are guaranteed.
To address this challenge, the Community Action Programme
organized and financed research into developing quality health
indicators throughout Europe in 2003. By June of 2006 the
European Community Health Indicator Project developed a list of
over 400 quality indicators.
C. Consumer Education: "Europe of Health"
In addition to providing forums for policymakers and
practitioners, by managing health information the Action
Programme has also committed resources to expanding the
quantity and quality of information available to consumers. This
enables consumers to make more informed decisions in selecting
care. Improving care therefore is not just a question of investing
more, but ensuring that "money is well spent. ' '218 Recent studies
conducted in the United States demonstrate that billions of dollars
are wasted on unnecessary, and even harmful, care because
patients, lacking basic information and the confidence to exercise
discretion in the care of their conditions, are unable to participate
in critical decisions.219 The result is the practice of defensive
medicine and over-utilization of services. ° Wasted resources are
not the only victims; approximately 1.5 million people suffer from
medication errors. 22' The Institute of Medicine estimates that over
217 See generally Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: The IOM
Health Care Quality Initiative (1996). http://www.iom.edu/CMS/8089.aspx (last visited
Sep. 20, 2007); see also T. Meehan, et. al., Quality of Care, Process, and Outcomes in
Elderly Patients with Pneumonia, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2080 (1997).
218 David Byrne, European Comm'r for Health and Consumer Protection, Address
at the EPC Conference: Enabling Good Health for All: The Future of Health in Europe
(July 15, 2004); see also Andrew Ruskin, Empowering Patients to Act Like Consumers:
A Proposal Creating Price and Policy Choice within Health Care, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
651, 661-662 (1994).
219 Blumenthal, supra note 55.
220 See generally Barry R. Furrow, Regulating for Patient Safety: Toward a Federal
Model of Medical Error Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
221 See COMMITrEE ON IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS,
PREVENTING MEDICATION ERRORS: QUALITY CHASM SERIES 105-107 (Phillip Aspden,
Julie Wolcott, J. L. Bootman, & Linda R. Cronenwett eds., 2007).
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3.5 billion dollars are spent annually in responsive treatment to
medication errors in the United States alone. 2
Correcting this system failure involves incorporating "not just
health care organizations and federal agencies, but... consumers...
[and] ensuring that consumers are fully informed., 223 The concept
of integrated, cooperative care does not only apply to
pharmaceutical decisions, but instead indicates a larger failing in
coordinated health systems.
The greater incorporation and education of patients as
consumers was central to Commissioner Byrne's proposed health
21strategy. 24 In his address to the European Health Forum,
Commissioner Byrne emphasized health information and
dissemination to citizens as a primary objective of EU action.
[T]he Community has an important role to play in the
dissemination of information and the empowerment of citizens...
One key action is to improve health information and make it more
widely available. By ensuring easy access to timely, accurate, and
authoritative information we can minimize the risk of people
relying on partial, biased or misleading information or advice.225
To this end, Commissioner Byrne proposed the creation of an
internet health portal for consumers. Establishing easily
accessible and reputable information on health care services
available, he argued, will enable patients "to become active
partners in managing their own health." 226 The EU launched the
proposed internet Health Portal and an E-Health Report Cards for
consumers in 2006.227
Once again the Community role focuses not only on the
222 Id. (It should be noted that this is a conservative estimate taking into account
only the direct medical costs incurred in correcting medication errors. It does not take
into account victims lost wages or productivity or overhead hospitalization costs.)
223 Press Release, The National Academies, Medication Errors Injure 1.5 Million
People and Cost Billions of Dollars Annually; Report Offers Comprehensive Strategies
for Reducing Drug-Related Mistakes (July 20, 2006) available at
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordlD= 11623.
224 See David Byrne, Enabling Good Health for All: A Reflection Process for a New
EU Health Strategy, July 15, 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/health/phoverview/
Documents/byrnereflection en.pdf.
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dissemination of information but its general management. Under
the earlier e-Europe 2002 Action Plan, the Commission developed
a core set of quality criteria to measure health related websites.2
As reiterated in the European e-Health Action Plan adopted in
2004, Community action takes a twin-track approach: maximizing
the quantity of information integration and exchange and the
quality of such communications.229
D. Legal Clarity: A "Framework Right" to Health Care
[The EU should] enable those responsible for health services
to have a clear framework of Community law within which they
can fulfill their responsibility and take advantage of cooperation
between health systems where this can help in providing safe, high
quality and efficient health services. In so doing this initiative can
also contribute to helping Member States in achieving a better use
of resources... through more efficient planning and allocation.23°
EU action is focused on the management and control of health
care information. 231' This includes the establishment of policy
forums, systems for scientific reference and the education of
health care consumers. The latter element (consumer education)
should not be underestimated in its importance to the overall
federal strategy; indeed the Union mandates certain standards in
communicating benefits to citizen-beneficiaries.232  This is
designed as a means of instituting or encouraging national policy
improvements and raising the general standard of care throughout
the EU.233 ECJ decisions not only provide directing principles to a
developing European Health strategy - it complements and
reinforces independent European action by requiring member
228 Information Can Save Your Life, Europa Website, http://europa.eu.int/
informationsociety/qualif/health/index-en.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2007)
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Kyprianou, supra note 18.
232 See Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms, supra note 30; see also Jason Nickless,
Smits/Peerbooms: Clarification of Kohll and Decker?, 7 EUROHEALTH 7, 9 (2001),
available at http://www.euro.who.int/Document/Obs/Eurohealth7_4.pdf.
233 See Mike Sedgley, Smits/Peerbooms: A Clarification of Confusion?, 7
EUROHEALTH I, I, available at http://www.euro.who.int/Document/Obs/
Eurohealth7_4.pdf (asserting that EJC decisions are designed to "move Member States to
clarify the entitlements to healthcare that they give to their national citizens").
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states to clearly articulate social security benefits available to
citizens.234 While assiduously asserting national right to determine
the nature and extent of citizen's health care rights, once the state
provides a right to a specific health care service it cannot prevent
or inhibit access to those same services in other Member States.235
A Member State must now clearly articulate the nature and extent
of services available to its citizens. 236 A clear national statement
of the health rights and services thus enables citizens to take
advantage of intra-national care and enables the federal EU system
to take advantage of market forces to encourage policy promotion
and potentially natural convergence. 237  The idea is to harness
economic power and encourage policy convergence and quality
control by mandating clear statements of national policy.
VIII.Conclusion: Evolving Dynamics in Governance
Finally, this brings us to an examination of the evolving nature
of governance and its impact on institutional dynamics and general
expectations of governance. As scholar Louise Trubeck
summarized, "New governance is transformative of law in that it
challenges what we think of as law., 238  New governance's
emphasis on flexible and persuasive mechanisms such as
consensus building, general guidelines, best practices and peer
review envision policy-making and attendant regulations as a
cooperative and evolving process; a process which involves many
players across many forums. 239 As such it may be distinguished
from the command-and-control old governance model. Under the
traditional regulatory model the state enforced compliance with
bright line rules. While such a structure provides clarity and
strong police power, it does not accommodate the demands of a
modern administrative state. 24" New governance corrects this
market failure and enables the adaption of existing governing





238 Trubeck, New Governance and Soft Law, supra note 36, at 149.
239 Id.
240 See id. at 147.
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in its 2000 White Paper on European Governance: "The Union
cannot develop and deliver policy in the same way as a national
government; it must build partnerships and rely on a wide variety
of actors. Expectations must be met in different ways."24'
CHRISTINA SIMPSON
241 White Paper, supra note 12, at 32.
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